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I.

INTRODUCTION

Codification was clearly in the air when Minnesota decided to
recodify their criminal code in the 1950s. Wisconsin completely
1
revised its criminal code in 1955; Illinois revamped its code in
2
1961. The granddaddy of all criminal codifications, the Model
†
Resident Adjunct Faculty, William Mitchell College of Law, and Assistant
Minnesota State Public Defender. Thanks to Wendy Bratten for her research and
writing.
†† J.D. Candidate, William Mitchell College of Law, 2013.
1. Alfred P. Murrah & Sol Rubin, Penal Reform and the Model Sentencing Act,
65 COLUM. L. REV. 1167, 1167 (1965).
2. Terri L. Mascherin et al., Reforming the Illinois Criminal Code: Where the
CLEAR Commission Stopped Short of Its Goals, 41 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 741, 742 (2008).
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Penal Code (MPC), was promulgated in 1962.
In revising its code, Minnesota took a substantially different
track than the MPC. The drafters of the MPC intended to
revolutionize criminal law; the Minnesota codifiers were trying
something less controversial but perhaps equally difficult: they were
trying to make sense of Minnesota’s Criminal Code. To a large
extent, they succeeded. The new criminal code was more coherent
and fit better into Minnesota’s overlying statutory scheme. But the
3
decision to revise rather than revolutionize created problems.
This article briefly describes the history of the revisions to the
Minnesota Criminal Code and its relationship to the Model Penal
Code, while making tangents into the history of the State of
Minnesota when helpful.
II. CRIMINAL LAW BEFORE MINNESOTA BECAME MINNESOTA
There were crimes, criminals, and criminal law before 1963; in
fact, there were crimes, criminals, and criminal law before
Minnesota
became
a
state.
The
Dakota
and
Ojibwe/Chippewa/Anishinaabe tribes inhabited the territory from
western Wisconsin to the Missouri River for many thousands of
4
years before European exploration. (Minnesota translates to “sky5
tinted water” in the Dakota language. ) Their bands formed a
6
political alliance called the Seven Fires and were bound by their
7
mutual obligation to protect their territory.
Native American justice systems were very different than the
Anglo-American system and frequently did not have written laws; as
a result, many settlers believed that Native Americans had no laws.
In fact, the Native American communities had many oral laws,
traditions, and ceremonies that structured and regulated their
8
communities.
There are other fundamental philosophical differences
between Anglo-American law and many tribal justice systems. For
3. See generally Ted Sampsell-Jones, Mens Rea in Minnesota and the Model Penal
Code, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1457 (2013).
4. MARY LETHERT WINGERD, NORTH COUNTRY: THE MAKING OF MINNESOTA 1
(2010).
5. Thomas D. Peacock & Donald R. Day, Nations Within a Nation: The Dakota
and Ojibwe of Minnesota, DAEDALUS, Summer 2000, at 137, 138.
6. Id. at 140.
7. WINGERD, supra note 4, at 1.
8. See CARRIE E. GARROW & SARAH DEER, TRIBAL CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE 9–11 (2004).
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example, the Anglo-American system differentiates between
criminal law and civil law; many Native communities did not
9
recognize this difference. In addition, many tribes treated a
harmful act as harmful to all of society, while other tribes allowed
10
individuals to avenge wrongs they suffered at the hands of others.
There is also a substantial difference in the philosophical
underpinnings of the two systems. Unlike Anglo-American laws,
the traditional law of many Native societies was considered to have
been given by the Creator and to possess a spiritual basis, including
the duties that stem from those beliefs. As a result, unlike AngloAmerican criminal laws that exclusively defined prohibited
11
behavior, Native laws were both proscriptive and normative.
III. THE CREATION OF MINNESOTA AND ITS CRIMINAL LAW
A.

From Territory to State

The land that would become Minnesota first came under the
control of the United States government upon passage of the
12
Northwest Ordinance in 1787.
The Northwest Ordinance
established a government over the Northwest Territory, of which
13
Minnesota was a part.
On March 3, 1849, the United States Congress passed the
Organic Act, providing for the territorial government of Minnesota
14
and fixing the borders of Minnesota Territory.
The Act also
established a bicameral legislative assembly, consisting of a ninemember council and an eighteen-member house of
15
representatives, and provided that certain laws of Wisconsin were
16
in force in Minnesota Territory. Since most of these laws were
17
civil in nature, it appears that the core of the criminal law existed
9. Id. at 4.
10. Id. at 13–16.
11. Id. at 10–11.
12. MINNESOTA LEGISLATIVE MANUAL 1957–1958, at 357 (1958).
13. Id. at 358.
14. Id. at 362.
15. Id.
16. See Laws of Wisconsin Now in Force in the Territory of Minnesota, ch.
45–73, 1849 Minn. Laws 106–60 (1850). Wisconsin’s laws provided the basis for
establishing county courthouses and jails, id. ch. 55; criminalizing certain offences
against the public health, such as selling rotten food or inoculating with smallpox,
id. ch. 56; providing for writ of habeas corpus for anyone imprisoned, id. ch. 57;
and abrogating the common law writ, id.
17. See id. ch. 45–73.
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only in common law form. The first territorial legislative session
convened on September 3, 1849, and went about enacting laws to
18
supplement those established by the Organic Act.
The next major landmark in Minnesota’s history was its
transition from territory to state. Henry M. Rice, the delegate to
Congress from the Territory of Minnesota, introduced a bill for an
act to authorize a state government for Minnesota in December
19
1856. This bill would become the Enabling Act and was approved
20
on February 27, 1857. While the act did not directly concern the
development of Minnesota’s criminal law—its primary purpose was
to establish state boundaries and provide for a state constitutional
21
convention —it put in place the structures necessary to establish
the State of Minnesota and, consequently, the legislative body that
would create and redefine the criminal law in the state.
Minnesota’s state constitutional convention was held from July
22
13 through August 29, 1857. Voters approved the constitution on
October 13, 1857, and it was submitted to the United States Senate
23
in December for ratification. At the same time, a bill to admit
24
Minnesota to the Union was submitted to Congress. On May 11,
1858, that bill passed Congress and was signed by President James
25
Buchanan.
The state constitution provided that all territorial laws
consistent with the state constitution remain in force unless they
26
expire or are changed by the legislature. Thus the criminal laws
Minnesota adopted when it became a territory became the laws of
the new state.
B.

Development of the Criminal Law

The criminal law in place when Minnesota became a
territory—essentially the common law, with a few statutory
27
additions —remained largely unchanged for almost thirty years. It
18.
19.
20.
21.
1975).
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 5.
MINNESOTA LEGISLATIVE MANUAL, supra note 12, at 368.
Id.
THEODORE C. BLEGEN, MINNESOTA: A HISTORY OF THE STATE 221 (2d ed.
MINNESOTA LEGISLATIVE MANUAL, supra note 12, at 370.
Id. at 370–71.
Id. at 401.
Id.
MINN. CONST. sched. § 4.
E.g., MINN. STAT. ch. 28, tit. 9, § 83 (1873) (providing for imprisonment
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wasn’t until 1885 that the legislature enacted a full codification of
28
Minnesota’s criminal laws. The revision, which went into effect
on January 1, 1886, consisted largely of adaptations of New York’s
29
1881 Penal Code. Importantly, however, the 1886 Code abolished
common-law criminal offenses; only acts or omissions criminalized
30
by statute were now punishable.
IV. REVISING MINNESOTA’S CRIMINAL CODE
A.

The Advisory Committee

For the next seventy-five years, Minnesota’s Criminal Code
remained substantially the same. Changes were made to the
criminal code, of course, but those changes were not well
integrated with other criminal provisions or made consistent with
31
prior laws. By the middle of the twentieth century, change was
afoot, and not just in Minnesota. Wisconsin completely revised its
32
33
criminal code in 1955; Illinois revamped its in 1961.
In 1955, the Minnesota legislature established the Interim
Commission on Juvenile Delinquency, Adult Crime, and
Corrections; the commission was tasked “to deal with the broad
34
problem of ‘juvenile delinquency, crime, and correction.’” One
of the herculean tasks that commission took on was the revision of
the criminal code.
The commission recognized that, while the ultimate
responsibility for revising Minnesota’s Criminal Code belonged to
the legislature, the “technical nature of the task” required the input
35
of the state’s bench and bar. The commission wrote to “all district
36
judges and all county attorneys asking their opinion of the need
or a fine for mistreating animals).
28. The state constitution provided that all territorial laws consistent with the
state constitution remain in force unless they expire or are changed by the
legislature. MINN. CONST. sched. § 4.
29. ADVISORY COMM. ON REVISION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, PROPOSED MINNESOTA
CRIMINAL CODE 9 (1962).
30. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 622.01 cmt. 1 (West 1945).
31. ADVISORY COMM. ON REVISION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 29, at 9.
32. Murrah & Rubin, supra note 1, at 1167.
33. Mascherin et al., supra note 2, at 742.
34. Maynard E. Pirsig, Proposed Revision of the Minnesota Criminal Code, 47
MINN. L. REV. 417, 417 (1963) (citation omitted).
35. ADVISORY COMM. ON REVISION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 29, at 5–6.
36. Apparently the commission did not feel the need to ask the opinions of
criminal defense lawyers.
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for and the feasibility of revising the criminal laws.” A “substantial
number urged the necessity for revision,” as did the leadership of
38
the Minnesota State Bar Association.
As a result, the commission invited “the legal organizations
39
most concerned [to] designate[] representatives” to serve on the
Advisory Committee on Revision of the Criminal Law. The
legislature did not renew the commission in 1961, but Governor
Elmer Anderson made state funds available that allowed the
advisory committee to complete its revision and submit it to the
40
1963 legislative session.
The drafters of the Minnesota Code looked mainly to
Wisconsin, which had adopted a new code in 1955, and the
American Law Institute, which was developing the Model Penal
41
Code at the time, for guidance. The 1961 Illinois Code revision
also proved helpful to the commission in reexamining the policies
42
of its nearly finished product.
In reevaluating and proposing revisions to the Minnesota
Criminal Code, the committee had several main objectives in mind.
First, it sought to remove inconsistent, duplicative, or obsolete
43
provisions. Gone, then, was the prohibition against taking more
44
than one-eighth of a portion as a toll for grinding grain. The
committee also worked to ensure that the elements of a crime were
45
The
stated in “clear, simple, and understandable terms.”
committee also believed that it was important to include in the
criminal code only matters of substantive criminal law, not
procedural provisions or regulatory measures, and recommended
46
transferring these provisions to other chapters.
In addition, the committee considered the degree of revision,
that is, whether to restate the law as it existed or to recommend
47
substantive improvements.
The committee could have left the
wording of the statutes unaffected and instead simply deleted
obsolete provisions, removed inconsistencies, and improved
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

ADVISORY COMM. ON REVISION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 29, at 6.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id. at 9.
MINN. STAT. § 614.51 (1961) (repealed 1963).
ADVISORY COMM. ON REVISION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 29, at 10.
Id.
Pirsig, supra note 34, at 424.
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48

classification.
But the Committee concluded that merely restating the
present law would not meet the needs of the present
criminal code nor the intent of the legislation which
established the Commission. . . .
The Committee felt that the revision should reflect
present-day standards in the science of legislation, the
progress that has been made in the administration of
criminal justice, and the improvements which present-day
standards, experience and practice have indicated are
49
need in the substantive provisions of the criminal code.
The committee, however, did not want to completely rewrite
criminal law in Minnesota; instead, it “operated within the
framework of the existing criminal code. For the most part, it did
not undertake to incorporate new criminal offenses. Rather, it
restated exiting crimes with such changes and improvements as
appeared justified in the light of present day knowledge and
50
principles.”
B.

The Model Penal Code

The limited goals of the advisory committee stand in sharp
contrast to the ambitious goals of the drafters of the Model Penal
Code. The Reporter of the MPC described the three requisite
inquiries in the study of penal law:
(1) What behavior ought to be made criminal and how
should it be defined? (2) What variations in the nature,
circumstances or results of criminal behavior or in the
character or situation of the individual offender should
have the legal consequences of varying the mode of
treatment of offenders? (3) What methods of treatment
ought to be prescribed or authorized in dealing with
offenders; what scope of discretion as to method should
be vested in administration; and in what agency or
51
agencies should such discretion be reposed?
The Model Penal Code contemplated “a systematic re52
examination” of these broad issues rather than simply making the
48. ADVISORY COMM. ON REVISION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 29, at 9.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Herbert Weschler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 HARV. L. REV.
1097, 1104–05 (1952).
52. Id. at 1130.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2013

7

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 5 [2013], Art. 1

1448

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:5

criminal law more coherent and concise.
The disparate goals of the two projects are perhaps best
illustrated by the makeup of the two committees. The Model Penal
Code had a “remarkably diverse advisory committee of law
professors, judges, lawyers, and prison officials, as well as experts
from the fields of psychiatry, criminology, and even English
53
literature.” The advisory committee in Minnesota, on the other
hand, was made up of almost exclusively lawyers and judges (and,
54
as far as could be determined, all white men).
To be fair,
however, the advisory committee did add diversity and, perhaps,
special insight into criminal law by including one member who was
55
subsequently convicted of murder.
C.

Changes

So, what changed? The title remained the same, descriptive
56
and alliterative: “Crimes, Criminals.” (The title has since been
57
changed but remains alliterative: “Criminal Code.”)
One noticeable difference between the 1963 Code and its
predecessor is the length. In 1961, the criminal code was 136
58
59
pages; after the revisions, it was down to seventy-five.
The
reduction in length is consistent with one of the general goals of
the advisory committee: removing unnecessary provisions (i.e.,
60
those that were duplicative, inconsistent, invalid, or obsolete).
D.

Obsolete Provisions

In its effort to remove unnecessary provisions, the drafters of
the 1963 revision took certain crimes off the books in furtherance
of the goal of eliminating obsolete provisions. Overhauling the
entire criminal code provided a rare opportunity to rid the law of
statutes whose utility had long since passed, including those crimes
that, because of political realities, might be impossible to excise any
53. Paul H. Robinson & Markus D. Dubber, The American Model Penal Code: A
Brief Overview, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 319, 323 (2007).
54. ADVISORY COMM. ON REVISION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 29, at 6–7.
55. See State v. Thompson, 273 Minn. 1, 139 N.W.2d 490 (1966); ADVISORY
COMM. ON REVISION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 29, at 7.
56. MINN. STAT. ch. 609 (1965); MINN. STAT. ch. 610 (1961).
57. MINN. STAT. ch. 609 (2012).
58. MINN. STAT. ch. 610–23 (1961).
59. MINN. STAT. ch. 609–23 (1965).
60. ADVISORY COMM. ON REVISION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 29, at 9.
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other way. The committee got it right by eliminating express
provisions against dueling but missed the mark by maintaining
fornication as a crime. Here, a glance at why one crime was
removed while the other remained.
1.

No Longer a Part of the Code: Dueling
61

The prohibition against dueling, a practice with a long
62
history in the American South, made its way into the territorial
and state statutes of Minnesota. The practice, “the ritual of retiring
63
to a field and firing pistols at one another to satisfy a social insult,”
occurred among those of high social standing, much to the chagrin
64
of state governments. If a man felt insulted, he would challenge
the offending man to a duel, and that man was then obliged to
65
fight or lose his honor and status within the community.
The biggest problem with dueling was that it frequently
resulted in death. Even a slight insult could result in death, and
the mode of the duel did not ensure that it was the guilty party who
received punishment. Whether or not a duel actually resulted in
the death of one of the principals, however, the practice
undermined state authority by substituting a private contest for
66
public adjudication.
Killing another in a duel that took place within the territory of
67
Minnesota constituted second-degree murder, the penalty for
68
which was life imprisonment. Seconds—representatives of each
69
party who managed the duel and advised their principals —of
either party present at the time a mortal wound was inflicted were
61. See generally Warren F. Schwartz et al., The Duel: Can These Gentlemen Be
Acting Efficiently?, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 321 (1984) (providing a detailed treatment of
dueling and its social context).
62. Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943,
968 (1995).
63. Id.
64. Katharine K. Baker, Sex, Rape, and Shame, 79 B.U. L. REV. 663, 700–01
(1999).
65. Id. at 700. Newspaper editors were among the most vociferous
proponents of anti-dueling laws, as their occupations involved leveling insults, and,
consequently, they were among the most likely to be challenged to a duel. Lessig,
supra note 62, at 970 n.79.
66. Lessig, supra note 62, at 969. “The duel was like a lawsuit where the
judge, after establishing that indeed there was a wrong, flips a coin to decide who,
between the plaintiff and the defendant, should be executed for the wrong.” Id.
67. MINN. STAT. ch. 100, § 24 (1851).
68. Id. § 2.
69. Schwartz et al., supra note 61, at 322 n.4.
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70

considered accessories before the fact to second-degree murder.
Murder by dueling, then, was simply a specific application of the
general prohibition against homicide.
The substance of the nineteenth-century law still remained in
71
72
the early 1960s but was removed in the 1963 revision. Under the
1963 Code, “if mutual combat does in fact take place, it will be
73
dealt with as a form of assault.” Society had sufficiently changed
so a more general provision could handle dueling.
2.

Still Here: Fornication

Although dueling is no longer a crime in Minnesota, certain
sexual behavior still is. Specifically, “[w]hen any man and single
74
woman have sexual intercourse with each other, each is guilty of
75
fornication,” which is a misdemeanor offense. The current statute
is remarkably similar to the analogous provision in the 1851
territorial statutes: “If any man shall commit fornication with any
single woman, each of them shall be punished by imprisonment in
the jail, not more than thirty days, or by fine not exceeding thirty
76
dollars.”
Ten states besides Minnesota currently have statutes
77
criminalizing fornication on the books, but courts in three of
78
these states have declared those statutes unconstitutional. While
70. MINN. STAT. ch. 100, § 25.
71. See MINN. STAT. §§ 619.46–.50 (1961).
72. Pirsig, supra note 34, at 417–18.
73. Id. at 418.
74. A married woman having sex with a man other than her husband is
punished under the adultery statute. MINN. STAT. § 609.36 (2012).
75. Id. § 609.34.
76. MINN. STAT. ch. 107, § 5 (1851).
77. See Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-18 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg.
Sess.)); Idaho (IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6603 (West, Westlaw through 2013));
Illinois (720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-40 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg.
Sess.)); Mississippi (MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-1 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg.
Sess.)); North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-184 (West, Westlaw through
S.L. 2013-14 of 2013 Reg. Sess.)); North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-2008 (West, Westlaw through 2011 Reg. and Special Sess.) (criminalizing fornication
in public)); South Carolina (S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-60 (West, Westlaw through
2012 Reg. Sess.)); Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-104 (West. Westlaw through 2012
4th Special Sess.)); Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-344 (West, Westlaw through
2012 Reg. Sess.)); Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. ANN. § 944.15 (West, Westlaw through
2013 Wis. Act 9) (criminalizing fornication in public)).
78. Georgia (In re J.M., 575 S.E.2d 441 (Ga. 2003)), North Carolina (Hobbs
v. Smith, No. 05 CVS 267, 2006 WL 3103008 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 25, 2006)), and
Virginia (Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E.2d 367 (Va. 2005)).
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the statute remains in the criminal code in Minnesota, the
Minnesota Supreme Court has noted that “police and prosecutors
generally
have
considered
[the
fornication
statute]
79
unenforceable.”
The last cited conviction for fornication
80
occurred in 1927, although it has been charged as recently as
81
1986.
82
The Model Penal Code does not criminalize fornication,
although early in the code’s development the MPC Advisory
Committee approved a fornication/cohabitation statute that made
sexual behavior between unmarried, opposite-sex couples a
83
misdemeanor if “[t]he behavior is open and notorious.” When it
considered criminalizing fornication, the MPC Advisory Committee
84
recognized that such provisions might present problems; it aimed
to “identify certain categories of illicit intercourse which the code
85
might reasonably undertake to punish” and encompass them in
the MPC.
The criminalization of fornication did not survive to the final
86
version of the MPC. A ten-page comment to Article 213 sets out
several reasons why the crime was eliminated. First, simply
contravening community norms of ethical behavior—the primary
reason underlying fornication laws—is “an insufficient basis for
imposition of penal sanctions” and criminalizes moral decisions
87
Fornication laws also involve
best left to the individual.
enforcement techniques that are injurious to personal privacy
interests and invade personal liberty. The allocation of scarce law
enforcement and judicial resources also supported the decision: “It
makes more sense to concentrate on conduct directly harmful to
79. In re Agerter, 353 N.W.2d 908, 915 (Minn. 1984).
80. See State v. Cavett, 171 Minn. 222, 213 N.W. 920 (1927).
81. See State v. Ford, 397 N.W.2d 875, 877 (Minn. 1986) (school teacher
originally charged with one count of sodomy under Minn. Stat. § 609.294, subdiv.
5, and one count of fornication under Minn. Stat. § 609.34 but convicted only of
misconduct of a public officer).
82. MODEL PENAL CODE art. 213 introductory note (Official Draft and Revised
Comments 1980).
83. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.1(a) (Tentative Draft 4 1955).
84. Id. § 207.1 cmt. I.
85. Id.
86. MODEL PENAL CODE art. 213 note on adultery and fornication 3 (Official
Draft and Revised Comments 1980). The requirement that the behavior occur
“openly” is the language suggested for the 1963 revision, but that language did not
make it into the final version of the statute. ADVISORY COMM. ON REVISION OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 29, at 97–98.
87. MODEL PENAL CODE art. 213 note on adultery and fornication 3.
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others than to divert attention and resources to instances of private
88
immorality.” While simply refusing to prosecute fornication could
solve these issues, the problems of selective enforcement, private
89
coercion, and disrespect for the criminal law would remain.
Finally, the drafters noted that, as more and more people see
cohabitation and sex outside of marriage as the norm,
criminalization will not equate to reducing or eliminating
90
“[T]here is no reason to believe that maintaining
behavior:
symbolic condemnations of fornication and adultery will have any
91
effect in inhibiting such conduct.”
The MPC drafters were correct, but Minnesota chose not to
follow their lead. In choosing to outlaw fornication, the Minnesota
drafters relied on comments to the earlier, unapproved draft of the
92
MPC that did criminalize fornication and simply creatively quoted
93
comments advanced in that draft as their reasoning for doing so.
Minnesota’s code drafters believed that fornication statutes
provide leverage against a putative father to provide support for a
child and give prosecutors a bargaining chip in plea negotiations in
94
rape cases. The advisory committee rationalized its decision to
continue to criminalize fornication by claiming that “[t]he Code
does not attempt to use the power of the state to enforce purely
95
moral or religious standards.”
But this is precisely what the statute does: it criminalizes moral
96
decisions best left to the individual. And so fornication remains a
crime in our state.

88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.1 (Tentative Draft 4 1955). That draft
required the behavior to be “open and notorious.” Id. § 207.1(a). The proposed
criminal code likewise included the “openly” language, ADVISORY COMM. ON
REVISION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 29, at 98, but the “open and notorious”
requirement did not survive to become law.
93. ADVISORY COMM. ON REVISION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 29, at 97–
98.
94. Id. at 98.
95. ADVISORY COMM. ON REVISION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 29, at 98.
96. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6, note on adultery and fornication at 437
(Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980).
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Clear and Understandable

Another goal of the committee was to state the law in clear,
97
Professor Pirsig nicely
simple, and understandable terms.
illustrated the difference when describing theft from a vending
machine. Before 1963, the law provided, in a single sentence:
Any person who shall operate or cause to be operated or
who shall attempt to operate or attempt to cause to be
operated any automatic vending machine, coin-box
telephone or other receptacle designed to receive lawful
coin of the United States of America in connection with
the sale, use or enjoyment of property or service, by
means of a slug or of any false, counterfeited, mutilated
or sweated coin, or by any means, method, trick or device
whatsoever not lawfully authorized by the owner, lessee or
licensee of such machine, coin-box telephone or
receptacle; or who shall take, obtain or receive from or
in connection with any automatic vending machine, coinbox telephone or other receptacle designed to receive
lawful coin of the United States of America in connection
with the sale, use or enjoyment of property or service,
any goods, wares, merchandise, gas, electric current,
article of value, or the use or enjoyment of any telephone
or telegraph facilities or service, or of any musical
instrument, phonograph or other property, without
depositing in and surrendering to such machine, coinbox telephone or receptacle, lawful coin to the amount
required therefore by the owner, lessee or licensee of
such machine, coin-box telephone or receptacle, shall be
98
guilty of a misdemeanor.
The proposed law, which encompassed the same conduct, was
covered in the theft section in a much simpler, more
understandable, and shorter sentence: “[Whoever intentionally]
obtains property or services, offered upon the deposit of a sum of
money or tokens in a coin or token operated machine or other
receptacle, without making the required deposit or otherwise
99
obtaining the consent of the owner [commits theft].”

97.
98.
99.

ADVISORY COMM. ON REVISION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 29.
Pirsig, supra note 34, at 422–23 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 621.341 (1961)).
Id. at 423 (quoting MINN. STAT. §609.52, subdiv. 2(7) (1965)).
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Revise but Not Revolutionize

Contrary to the drafters of the Model Penal Code, the advisory
committee wanted to revise, but not revolutionize, criminal law.
How the advisory committee dealt with the most serious offense,
first-degree murder, illustrated its intent to refine, but not
revolutionize, criminal law in Minnesota.
Famously, the MPC eliminated the degrees of murder and
rejected the idea that a premeditated murder was the most
100
culpable type of murder.
The advisory committee recognized
that a premeditated murder might not be the most culpable type of
murder: “The person who ponders, hesitates, and doubts, but
under the stress of real or supposed circumstances, finally
determines to commit the final act is a less dangerous individual
and less to be condemned than one who without hesitation or
inhibitions and without premeditation instantly but intentionally
101
kills his victim.”
Moreover, the advisory committee also recognized that, as
interpreted, premeditation had almost no meaning, “only that an
102
interval of time was needed sufficient to form the intent.” Pirsig
illustrated his point by citing, somewhat disdainfully, State v. Prolow,
a decision from the Minnesota Supreme Court that sustained an
instruction defining premeditation:
[P]remeditation may be formed at any time, moment, or
instant before the killing. Premeditation means thought
of beforehand for any length of time, no matter how
short. There need be no appreciable space of time
between the intention of killing and the act. They may be
103
as instantaneous as the successive thoughts of the mind.
Nonetheless,
the
advisory
committee
put
aside
“[c]onsiderations of this kind” and elected to continue to
104
distinguish between intentional and premeditated murders.
But
the advisory committee did attempt to “give some substance and
meaning to the distinction between first and second degree
murder” by defining premeditation as meaning “to consider, plan
or prepare for, or determine to commit, the act referred to prior to

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

See MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.6 cmt. 3 (Tentative Draft 9 1959).
Pirsig, supra note 34, at 426.
Id.
98 Minn. 459, 461, 108 N.W. 873, 874 (1906).
Pirsig, supra note 34, at 426
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105

its commission.”
By so defining premeditation, the advisory
committee hoped that the severe sentence of life imprisonment for
first-degree murder “[would] be reserved for those cases involving
the murderer who lies in wait for his victim, or plans, calculates,
106
and prepares to commit the fatal act.”
Alas, this is not what happened. In fact, the Minnesota
Supreme Court has held almost the opposite: “In a prosecution for
murder in the first degree, extensive planning and calculated
107
deliberation need not be shown by the prosecution.”
According
to the Minnesota Supreme Court, “[t]he requisite ‘plan’ to commit
a first-degree murder can be formulated virtually instantaneously
108
by a killer.”
In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court
cited State v. Prolow—the same case that Pirsig had used disdainfully
to illustrate his point that there should be some substance and
meaning to the distinction between first- and second-degree
109
murder.
And, it is important to note, it is now even more crucial to
distinguish between first- and second-degree murder. The advisory
committee attempted to import “substance and meaning” to the
term premeditation because of the difference in punishment
between the two offenses; first-degree premeditated murder carried
a sentence of life in prison with the possibility of parole, while the
punishment for second-degree intentional murder was for a term
110
of not exceeding forty years.
Now, the sentence for first-degree premeditated murder is life
111
without the possibility of parole while the term of imprisonment for
112
second-degree murder is a little less than seventeen years.

105. MINN. STAT. § 609.18 (1965).
106. Pirsig, supra note 34, at 426.
107. State v. Flores, 418 N.W.2d 150, 155 (Minn. 1988).
108. Id. (citing State v. Neumann, 262 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1978)).
109. Id. at 155–56.
110. Pirsig, supra note 34, at 425.
111. MINN. STAT. § 609.106, subdiv. 2 (2012).
112. This is the presumptive term of imprisonment according to the
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines for a person with a criminal history score of
zero. See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDLELINES & COMMENTARY § 4.A (2012). In
Minnesota, a person serves two-thirds of his sentence in prison and one-third on
parole; the actual presumptive sentence under the Guidelines would be twenty-five
and one-half years. Id. The statutory sentence for second degree intentional
murder is still for a term not exceeding forty years. MINN. STAT. § 609.19,
subdiv. 1.
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V. CONCLUSION
Seventy-eight years passed between the adoption of the first
criminal code in Minnesota and the passage of its revision in 1963.
As the ‘63 revision reaches its fiftieth anniversary this year, it is wise
to reflect upon the changes it made to Minnesota law, both where
it improved the law and where we might seek to improve the
criminal code as we look to the future.
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